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A TALE OF TWO STATUTES: ZEPEDA AND THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT’S DESCENT INTO JURISDICTIONAL MADNESS 
Luke Emmer Miles* 
When Europeans began their invasion of America, they sought to 
understand, legitimize, and elevate their actions through a 
mythology in which they juxtaposed themselves as ‘civilized’ 
Christians to the ‘savage,’ heathen natives. In so doing they 
maximized the differences between themselves and the Indians in 
moral, biological, and cultural terms. It is not surprising that 
these myths informed historical as well as first-hand and 
imaginative representations of Indian-white relations for several 
centuries; what is surprising is their staying power among 
contemporary scholars supposedly emancipated from the 
religious and racial superstations of the past. 
– Neal Salisbury1 
I. Introduction 
What makes a person an Indian? Do they need a name like Sitting Bull 
or is Jim Thorpe enough? Should they wear a headdress with war paint 
under their eyes? How much Indian blood does it take to be authenticated 
as a real, live Indian? History is replete with American archetypes for the 
Indian, from the feather-adorned, high cheek boned logo of the Washington 
Redskins to Twain’s alcohol-guzzling, hate-seething, white-folk-terrorizing 
“Injun Joe.” Perhaps the real Indian is relegated to the past, having died the 
day the first white foot stepped on North America, his ancestors fated to 
live forever as a construct of European minds wrestling to grasp that which 
they could never truly understand. Or maybe he lives in the shadow of the 
“Hollywood Indian,” waiting for the day when his European visage is torn 
asunder and his true face restored. In the words of one scholar, “In the 
                                                                                                                 
 * Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Neal Salisbury, American Indians and American History, in THE AMERICAN INDIAN 
AND THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY 46 (Calvin Martin ed., 1987). Dr. Salisbury is a professor of 
history at Smith College. He specializes in American Indian and Colonial New England 
history. 
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centuries since Columbus got lost in 1492, a plethora of European social 
philosophers have attempted to ‘place’ Indians within the context of a 
Western intellectual tradition that never expected a Western Hemisphere, 
much less an inhabited one, to exist.”2 Non-Indians have never had a clear 
conception of who or what an Indian is, evidenced by Columbus’s 
misnomer (calling the Native peoples of North America Indians because of 
the mistaken belief that Columbus had found the Indies) that still thrives 
today, in parlance and statute. It should come as no surprise that federal 
courts grapple with the question of who is an Indian. But is this inquiry 
within the province of federal courts to answer? 
Perhaps the question of what makes a person an Indian is better 
understood when broken down into two parts. First, what is an Indian, and 
second, who is an Indian? Answering the first question of what an Indian is 
produces parameters for Indian status determination (e.g., an Indian is 
someone who is a member of a federally recognized tribe). Thus, answering 
the second question becomes a matter of determining whether a person 
meets those parameters set by the first question. What we can glean from 
this structure of inquisition is that if the parameters are faulty, then 
answering the second question accurately becomes hopelessly arduous, if 
not impossible. Why is any of this important? The determination of Indian 
status is at the core of the Ninth Circuit’s recent case, United States v. 
Zepeda,3 and alas, the court missed the mark. 
The Ninth Circuit’s use of the “Bruce Test,”4 an inadequate rendering of 
guidelines for determining who is an Indian, produces problematic results 
(best evidenced by their holding in Zepeda) in which the determination of 
Indian status cannot be accurately achieved. Moreover, the Bruce Test 
requires a court to answer a question that it seemingly does not have the 
authority to answer because, under this test, a court determines whether 
someone is an Indian rather than a tribe. However, it has long been 
established that “Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Michael Dorris, Indians on the Shelf, in THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND THE PROBLEM 
OF HISTORY, supra note 1, at 100. The American Indian and the Problem of History is a 
fascinating collection of essays shedding light on a myriad of problems which arise in 
identifying the American Indian in a history reflective of European victors.  
 3. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201 (9th Cir. 2013), superseding 705 F.3d 1052, 
reh’g en banc granted, 742 F. 3d 910 (2014). 
 4. See United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005) (enunciating that because 
“Indian” is not statutorily defined, “the generally accepted test for Indian status considers 
‘“(1) the degree of Indian blood; and (2) tribal or government  recognition as an Indian.”’”); 
see also id. at 1224 (citing United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1996)); United 
States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1979). 
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membership . . . .”5 This is true even in extreme cases where the distinction 
is drawn between patrilineal and matrilineal membership.6 The first prong 
of the Bruce Test, which requires a showing of Indian blood,7 is an 
impermissible race classification that changes Indian status from a political 
distinction8 to a racial one. This is contradictory to Supreme Court 
precedent that clearly establishes that Indian within the context of federal 
legislation is necessarily political to avoid unconstitutional racial 
discrimination. Understanding Zepeda and its effects in context begins with 
exploring the case itself. Once the details of Zepada have been sufficiently 
fleshed out, one must explore the history and construction of the General 
Crimes Act and Major Crimes Act to understand why the Bruce Test exists. 
The next step is to delve into the Bruce Test and understand its relationship 
with the Supreme Court precedent that it seemingly contradicts. Finally, 
one must examine Zepeda in light of the aforementioned forays to unveil 
why it was wrongly decided and how the court could have avoided the 
destructive holding that was issued. 
II. Tribes and Communities: A Brief History 
A cursory overview of the various tribes and communities involved in 
Zepeda is critical in understanding the multidimensional and often 
confusing nomenclature in federal Indian law. The Zepeda opinion itself 
makes reference to different political and physical communities, namely, 
the Ak-Chin Indian Reservation, the Gila River Indian Community, and the 
“Pima,” “Tiho,” “Tohono O’odham,” and “Tohono O’odham Nation of 
Arizona.”9  
The Ak-Chin Indian Community is located on the Maricopa (Ak-Chin) 
Reservation in Arizona, and is home to primarily Tohono O’odham and 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981) (citing United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 n.18 (1978)); id. (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U.S. 145 (1973)) (“[T]ribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the 
tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.”).  
 6. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 47, 52-56 (1978) (holding that it was 
within the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe’s sovereign authority to reject membership for children 
born to a mother who was an enrolled member and a white man even though they would be 
eligible for enrollment if the father was enrolled and the mother was white). 
 7. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215.  
 8. See generally United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (discussing that 
“Indian” is a political distinction, rather than racial, which has to do with the relationship of 
a person to the federal government). 
 9. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 201, 212 (9th Cir. 2013).  
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Akimel O’odham Indians.10 Nearby, the Gila River Indian Community was 
established on February 28, 1895, and is located approximately forty miles 
south of Phoenix, Arizona.11 It is home to Akimel O’odham and Pee-Posh 
(Maricopa) Indians.12 The Gila River Indian Community government was 
reorganized under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in 1934.13 People 
considered Akimel O’odham and Maricopa (Pee Posh) have been a part of 
the Gila River Indian Community since its creation and are federally 
recognized.14 
Pima is an alternate name for both the Tohono O’odham and Akimel 
O’odham, given to them by Spanish explorers.15 However, for many years 
the Tohono O’odham referred to themselves as Papago,16 and the Akimel 
O’odham are generally called Pima.17 “Tiho” is likely an error on the 
record, which is supposed to be “T.O.” - a colloquial reference for Tohono 
O’odham.18 
The name Tohono O’odham may refer to many different things. There 
are Tohono O’odham Indians generally and also the Tohono O’odham 
Nation (of Arizona).19 The latter comprises three reservations, the San 
Xavier Reservation, the Gila Bend Reservation, and the Tohono O’odham 
Reservation.20 The reservations were created between 1874 and 1917, and 
                                                                                                                 
 10. OFFICIAL WEBSITE AK-CHIN INDIAN COMMUNITY, http://www.ak-chin.nsn.us/ 
index.php (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). Although the court refers to the “Ak-Chin Indian 
Reservation,” this is technically a misnomer because it is more properly the Maricopa (Ak-
Chin) Reservation. 
 11. NATIVE AMERICA IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 452 (Mary B. 
Davis ed., 1996) [hereinafter DAVIS]. 
 12. Tribal History, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY, 
http://www.gilariver.org/index.php/about-tribe/profile/history/115-tribal-history (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2014). 
 13. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 440. 
 14. Tribal History, OFFICIAL HOMEPAGE OF THE GILA RIVER INDIAN COMMUNITY, 
http://www.gilariver.org/index.php/about-tribe/profile/history/115-tribal-history (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2014). 
 15. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 452. 
 16. Id. at 637. 
 17. Id. at 452. Both tribes speak the same language, O’odham, and “Pima” is probably 
more reflective of that than their individual traditions. Id. 
 18. 9th Circuit Reverses Conviction over Indian Status of Defendant, INDIANZ.COM, 
http://www.indianz.com/News/2013/008249.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2013). “Tiho” was 
taken from the testimony of Matthew Zepeda, which likely accounts for the error. Id.  
 19. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 637; see also United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 212-
13 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 20. Id.  
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the government of the Tohono O’odham Nation was recognized by the 
United States through the IRA in 1937. The Ak-Chin Indian Community, of 
the Maricopa (Ak-Chin) Indian Reservation, Arizona,21 the Gila River 
Indian Community, of the Gila River Indian Reservation, Arizona,22 and the 
Tohono O’odham Nation of Arizona23 are all federally recognized tribal 
nations. The ancestry of the O’odham speaking tribes stretches back to 
prehistoric times, and they have lived in and around the same area for at 
least the last 400 years.24  
As an additional note, holdings of the Ninth Circuit are of special 
importance in the area of federal Indian law. According to the United States 
Census Bureau’s 2010 results, slightly over thirty-four percent of the 
population that identifies as either American Indian or Alaskan Native 
resides in the Ninth Circuit.25 Consequently, the holdings of the Ninth 
Circuit have a disproportionate effect on Indians, and should be afforded 
closer review. 
III. United States v. Zepeda: What Happened and Why? 
On October 25, 2008, Damien Zepeda and his brothers, Jeremy and 
Matthew, drove to the Ak-Chin Indian reservation in Arizona to the house 
of Dallas Peters.26 Peters was allegedly involved in a relationship with 
Zepeda’s ex-girlfriend, Stephanie Aviles.27 When Damien Zepada arrived at 
Peters’s house, he confronted and attacked Aviles, who was there with 
another individual. Peters tried to intervene in the conflict, and Zepada shot 
him several times. Peters was seriously injured, but he did not die as a result 
of the injuries.28 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Notice of Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the 
United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, No. 19, 79 Fed. Reg. 4748 (Jan. 29, 2014), available 
at http://www.federalregister.gov (locate the search box in the top right corner and enter 
“Indian Entities Recognized,” press search, and follow the hyperlink that bears the same 
name as above). 
 22. Id. at 4750. 
 23.  Id. at 4752. 
 24. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 452, 637. 
 25. U.S. Census Bureau Population Div., Annual Estimates of the Resident Population 
by Sex, Race Alone or in Combination, and Hispanic Origin for the United States, States, 
and Counties: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 2013), http:// 
factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk. 
 26. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 203 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 27. Id. at 203 n.1. 
 28. Id.  
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Zepeda was charged with assault under the Major Crimes Act,29 which 
provides for federal jurisdiction over enumerated crimes perpetrated by an 
Indian against an Indian within “Indian Country.”30 Under the Major 
Crimes Act, the government must prove the defendant’s Indian status 
beyond a reasonable doubt.31 Further, as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, 
the first prong of the Bruce Test requires a showing that “the defendant’s 
‘bloodline be derived from a federally recognized tribe.’”32 Federal 
prosecutors introduced evidence at trial to prove Zepeda was an Indian, 
including a document entitled “’Gila River Enrollment/Census Office 
Certified Degree of Indian Blood’. The document bore an ‘official seal’ and 
stated that Zepeda was ‘an enrolled member of the Gila River Indian 
Community,’ and that the ‘information [wa]s taken from the official records 
and membership roll of the Gila River Indian Community.’”33 The 
document specified that Zepeda had a “Blood Degree” of “1/4 Pima” and 
“1/4 Tohono O’Odham.”34 The Tribal Enrollment Certificate was published 
in conjunction with the testimony of Detective Sylvia Soliz, who worked 
for the Ak-Chin Police Department.35 Soliz testified that the Tribal 
Enrollment Certificate was confirmation that Zepeda met the blood 
quantum requirements for the tribe, was an enrolled member, and thus was 
entitled to receive tribal benefits.36 Other evidence presented as to Zepeda’s 
Indian status was the testimony of Zepeda’s brother, Matthew, who stated 
that he and Zepeda, who shared the same parents, were “half ‘Native 
                                                                                                                 
 29. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (West 2014). 
 30. Indian Country is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 as  
all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, 
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent 
Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the 
original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or 
without the limits of a state . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012). Whether Zepeda’s crime fell under § 1153 was not challenged and 
is not an issue here. 
 31. Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 210; see also Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, To Be or Not to 
Be: Who Is an “Indian Person,” 73 MONT. L. REV. 61, 63 (2012) (citing United States v. 
James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1317-19 (9th Cir. 1992)); United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 
1262 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
 32. Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 210 (citing United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th 
Cir. 2010)). 
 33. Id. at 204. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 205. 
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American’” and half Mexican.37 More specifically, Matthew testified that 
both he and his brother were “Pima and [T.O.].”38  
The jury found that Zepeda’s Indian status had been sufficiently proven, 
and convicted him on all counts.39 Zepeda challenged the sufficiency of the 
state’s evidence in proving his Indian status beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
Ninth Circuit upheld this challenge, and ruled that a “Certificate of 
Enrollment in an Indian tribe” was not “sufficient evidence for a rational 
juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is an Indian for 
the purposes of § 1153 [without] evidence that the defendant’s bloodline is 
derived from a federally recognized tribe.”40  
The court discussed whether Zepeda’s bloodline could be traced to a 
federally recognized tribe. It ultimately concluded that “[t]here [was] no 
evidence in the record that the ‘Tohono O’Odham’ referenced in Zepeda’s 
Tribal Enrollment Certificate refers to the federally recognized Tohono 
O’Odham Nation of Arizona.”41 The court further reasoned that they were 
not at liberty to assume that “Tohono O’odham” and “Tohono O’odham 
Nation of Arizona” were the same, and that there was no way a jury could 
conclude this beyond a reasonable doubt.42 The court never discussed the 
“1/4 Pima” blood on Zepeda’s Tribal Enrollment Certificate, even though 
the Gila River Indian Community, the federally recognized Indian 
community that issued the certificate, is the home of the Akimel O’odham 
(Pima) Indians. Because the court ruled that Zepeda’s lineage had not been 
sufficiently established, the second prong of the Bruce Test was never 
addressed.43 
Damien Zepeda’s curious case leaves us with the following questions: 
Why do we need the Bruce Test? Is the Bruce Test the appropriate way to 
determine Indian status? Pending resolution of the two previous questions, 
did the Ninth Circuit decide the case incorrectly? 
  
                                                                                                                 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. The actual record says here that Matthew said “Tiho.” But see supra text 
accompanying note 18. 
 39. Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 204. 
 40. Id. at 213. 
 41. Id. at 212 (validating Zepeda’s argument that the “Tohono O’Odham Nation of 
Arizona” and not simply “Tohono O’Odham” appeared on the BIA list of federally 
recognized tribes). 
 42. Id. at 213. 
 43. Id. at 214. 
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IV. The Major Crimes Act and General Crimes Act: Two Statutes or One?  
The impetus behind the Bruce Test is the ambiguity of two statutes that 
confer federal jurisdiction in Indian Country. Both the Major Crimes Act 
(MCA) and General Crimes Act’s (GCA) grants of jurisdiction require 
identification of the defendant as an Indian or non-Indian, but neither 
statute defines Indian, seemingly leaving it up to the courts to decide.44 
Although Zepeda was charged under the MCA, that statute tells us only part 
of a story. The GCA, which preceded the MCA by some sixty-eight years, 
is the wellspring of the MCA. The GCA was passed in 1817 and provides 
federal jurisdiction for crimes committed against Indians by non-Indians in 
Indian Country.45 It provides in pertinent part, 
[T]he general laws of the United States as to the punishment of 
offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive 
jurisdiction of the United States . . . shall extend to the Indian 
country. 
 . . . [except for] offenses committed by one Indian against the 
person or property of another Indian . . . .46 
The MCA47 was passed in 188548 to provide federal jurisdiction for 
serious crimes committed in Indian Country. The statute provides: “Any 
Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Margo S. Brownell, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at 
the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 283 (2000-2001) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)). 
 45. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
 46. Id. The statute reads in full:  
 Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the 
United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within 
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of 
Columbia, shall extend to the Indian country. 
 This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against 
the person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any 
offense in the Indian country who has been punished by the local law of the 
tribe, or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction 
over such offenses is or may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively. 
Id. 
 47. 18 U.S.C.A § 1153 (West 2014). 
 48.  Jacqueline F. Langland, Indian Status Under the Major Crimes Act, 15 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 109, 114 (2012). 
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other person any of the [listed offenses] within the Indian country, shall 
be . . . within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.”49 
The MCA and GCA are, in essence, intrusions into tribal sovereignty. 
They are statutory mechanisms by which the federal courts can encroach 
upon tribal sovereignty and exert federal power. The MCA was passed due 
to legislative doubt as to tribes’ ability to maintain judicial integrity.50 The 
MCA simply expands the federal jurisdiction provided by the earlier GCA.  
As the Eighth Circuit properly recognized in United States v. 
Whitehorse,51 the statutes, when taken together, cover anyone who commits 
a crime in Indian Country, because “everyone is either an Indian. . . or 
not.”52 From this perspective, the MCA seems supplementary; it is an effort 
to provide federal courts with jurisdiction even over Indians when certain 
serious crimes have been committed, a power which previously resided 
with tribal sovereigns until divested by Congress. Federal courts did not 
previously have jurisdiction to punish Indians within Indian Country under 
the GCA’s limited jurisdiction.53 Indeed, the only palpable distinction 
between the two statutes resides in the determination of Indian status, 
meaning that the MCA was merely intended to cover those defendants who 
were not covered by the GCA because they were Indians. The statutes 
could be combined into one, conferring federal court jurisdiction over 
certain crimes for both Indians and non-Indians, and the statutes would 
have the same effect without the confusion that they currently create. The 
statutes are fundamentally related, yet because they are in fact two separate 
grants of jurisdiction based upon who is or is not Indian, with no indication 
of what an Indian is. The courts are forced to make the determination of 
                                                                                                                 
 49. 18 U.S.C.A § 1153(a). The statute reads in full:  
 (a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another 
Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, a 
felony assault under section 113, an assault against an individual who has not 
attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, 
robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian country, 
shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing 
any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. 
Id. 
 50. Langland, supra note 48, at 114-15 (discussing that the Major Crimes Act was 
passed as a direct response to Ex parte Crowe Dog in which an Indian received a lenient 
sentence from the tribal court for murdering another Indian, but the federal courts declined 
jurisdiction). 
 51. United States v. White Horse, 316 F.3d 769, 772-73 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 52. Id. at 773. 
 53. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
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Indian status on their own. For the Ninth Circuit, the remedy is the Bruce 
Test. 
V. The Bruce Test: The Court Plays the Role of the Tribe 
In United States v. Bruce, the Ninth Circuit enunciated that: “The 
generally accepted test for Indian status considers ‘(1) the degree of Indian 
blood; and (2) tribal or government recognition as an Indian.’”54 The two 
prongs of the Bruce Test appear to have evolved from different Supreme 
Court precedent, which as it turns out, seems to be in direct and 
irreconcilable conflict. Understanding the origins of the respective prongs 
enables us to understand why the test seems to produce logically 
inconsistent results. 
“The first prong requires ancestry living in America before the 
Europeans arrived . . . .”55 The Ninth Circuit has since clarified that the test 
requires that the defendant’s “bloodline be derived from a federally 
recognized tribe.”56 The origins of the first prong of the test can be traced 
back to United States v. Rogers.57 In Rogers, a white man was accused of 
murder in Indian Country. He claimed that he was not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States because the GCA’s grant of jurisdiction, 
under which he was prosecuted, did “not extend to crimes committed by 
one Indian against the person or property of another Indian.”58  
Rogers claimed that he voluntarily removed himself from the United 
States to Cherokee country where he was adopted by the tribe, and he 
“exercised all the rights and privileges of a Cherokee Indian” in the tribe.59 
Without engaging in any discussion of whether Rogers had the political 
characteristics of an Indian, or the relevant relationship with the federal 
government, the court summarily dismissed his plea, noting that “Indian,” 
in the context of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834,60 was a racial 
                                                                                                                 
 54. United States v. Bruce, 94 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. 
Keys, 103 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 57. 45 U.S. 567 (1846). The Bruce Court references Rogers in support of the test in both 
Bruce itself as well as United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1996). Both Keys 
and Bruce show that the first prong of the test is derived from the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Rogers. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567; United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 58. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572. 
 59. Id. at 571. 
 60. Id. at 572-73. This was the statute under which Rogers was indicted. Id. The Ninth 
Circuit identified it as the precursor to the MCA. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1223. 
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distinction.61 Rogers was “a white man, of the white race, and therefore not 
within the exception.”62 The Rogers Court did more than simply reject that 
“Indian” could be something other than a racial distinction; it essentially 
classified “Indian” exclusively as a racial distinction. Thus, the first prong 
of the Bruce Test is inherently a question of race—it serves solely as a 
means to gauge whether the person in question is the proper race for 
jurisdiction under the GCA. It is worth noting that sometimes the Bruce 
Test is called the Rogers Test, or at least it is credited as having been first 
proposed as the proper test in Rogers.63 However, Rogers summarily 
dismisses any other kind of test and focuses only on the race of the 
defendant.64 
The second prong of the Bruce Test is multifaceted. While the first prong 
focuses only on the race of the individual, the second prong “probes 
whether the Native American has a sufficient non-racial link to a formerly 
sovereign people.”65 When analyzing this prong, courts have considered, in 
declining order of importance, evidence of the following: “1) tribal 
enrollment; 2) government recognition formally and informally through 
receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; 3) enjoyment of the benefits 
of tribal affiliation; and 4) social recognition as an Indian through residence 
on a reservation and participation in Indian social life.”66 
The second prong of the test can be traced to United States v. Antelope.67 
Antelope is the basis for the proposition that “Indian” is a political 
distinction rather than a racial one. In Antelope, Gabriel Francis Antelope 
and Leonard Davison were convicted of first-degree murder via felony-
                                                                                                                 
 61. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 573 (“[A white man adopted into a tribe as an adult] is not an 
Indian; and the exception is confined to those who by the usages and customs of the Indians 
are regarded as belonging to their race. It does not speak of members of a tribe, but of a race 
generally,-of the family of Indians . . . .”). 
 62. Id.  
 63. See Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1225; United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Torres, 733 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 64. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572-73. 
 65. Bruce, 394 F.3d at 1224 (quoting St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 
1461 (D.S.D. 1988)). 
 66. Id. (quoting United States v. Lawrence, 51 F.3d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 1995)).  
 67. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977). The Bruce Court cites to St. 
Cloud, as support for the second prong of the test, and St. Cloud in turn, cites to Antelope. 
See Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 at 1224; St. Cloud, 702 F. Supp. at 1461. 
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murder provisions68 after robbing and killing an eighty-one-year-old, non-
Indian woman on the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation in Idaho.69 
Antelope, who was convicted under the MCA, argued that a non-Indian 
who committed the same crime would have been tried under Idaho state 
law, which did not contain a felony-murder provision. This would have 
required the state to prove additional mens rea elements to convict him of 
first-degree murder.70 Further, Antelope argued that the grant of jurisdiction 
over “Indian” persons under the MCA was “invidious racial 
discrimination.”71 The Supreme Court upheld the convictions, stating 
emphatically that “Indian” in the context of federal legislation is not an 
impermissible racial classification, but rather a political delineation.72 
The Bruce Test boils down to a racial prong and a non-racial prong. As 
applied in Zepeda, a person must meet the first prong before the court will 
even analyze the second prong, which in application makes “Indian” a 
wholly racial distinction. The only way that the MCA can apply is if a 
person is, in racial terms, an “Indian.” The utter lack of congruence 
between the two prongs is dumbfounding. The first prong rests on Supreme 
Court precedent, which explicitly says that “Indian” is a racial 
classification, while the second prong rests on precedent from the same 
court that vehemently denies that “Indian” is a racial classification. 
Moreover, both Rogers and Antelope deal with the same family of statutes. 
Interestingly, Antelope makes no mention of Rogers whatsoever, rendering 
the latter good law, even though it is in obvious contradiction to the more 
modern precedent. 
Perhaps questions as to the inconsistencies between the two opinions are 
better answered by history. In the 136 years between Rogers and Antelope, 
the United States abolished slavery (1865), added the Equal Protection 
Clause (1968), and granted women voting rights (1920).73 In that same 
time, the United States transitioned from a country that classified African 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 643. The felony-murder provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1111 was 
applicable to Antelope because he was being charged under the Major Crimes Act. 
Antelope, 430 U.S. at 643. 
 69. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 642. 
 70. Id. at 643-44. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 645 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553–54 (1974)) (comparing the 
“Indian” preference to jurisdictional requirements for United States Senators or city 
councilmen); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (discussing the refusal of 
benefits for non-Indians to an Indian). 
 73. These dates are based on when the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Nineteenth 
Amendments were enacted, not proposed. 
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Americans as property to one in which African Americans can attend the 
same schools and enjoy the same privileges as other citizens. This is to say 
that both politics and the law have changed drastically in the United States 
since 1841. Rogers is swaddled in antiquity and inequity, a hallmark of a 
much darker time in our nation’s history when learned men believed that 
“[w]hen the term Indian is used in our acts of congress, it means that savage 
and roaming race of red men given to war and the chase for a living, and 
wholly ignorant of the pursuits of civilized man . . . .”74 However, it is not 
enough to simply declare that Rogers is wrong. The Bruce Test and its 
racial prong make no sense in terms of statutory construction. 
As discussed supra, the statutory grant of jurisdiction under the MCA 
and GCA leaves open-ended the question of who or what is an Indian. It is 
precisely this context that provides some guidance as to how that question 
is best answered. Generally, Indian Country is part of a tribe’s sovereign 
territory (or at least under the tribe’s dominion).75 Although many tribes 
have idiosyncratic relations with the federal government, tribes normally 
have inherent authority over what happens in Indian Country, even so far as 
exercising power over non-members in limited circumstances.76 Congress 
typically uses its power to regulate activity within Indian Country in order 
to achieve and maintain a balance between two sovereigns. The relationship 
between the United States and sovereign tribes is best explained by John 
Marshall in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia: 
[Indian tribes] may more correctly perhaps be denominated 
domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which 
we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect 
in point of possession when their right of possession ceases-
meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relations to the 
United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian. They look 
to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its 
power; appeal to it for relief to their wants . . . .77 
                                                                                                                 
 74. United States v. Lucero, 1 N.M. 422, 431 (1869). 
 75. See discussion supra note 30. 
 76. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 205 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that Indian tribes 
have exclusive jurisdiction over Indian on Indian crime); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 
193, 199 (2004) (holding that tribal authority to punish nonmember offenders in Indian 
Country is an inherent power of the tribe as a sovereign rather than a delegated federal 
power). 
 77. 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 1-2 (1831). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014
282 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
 
 
Federal oversight of tribal governments serves an obvious purpose - there is 
desire by the federal government to have some control over tribal nations 
within the United States. 
The GCA allows federal regulation of crimes committed by non-Indians 
where it would otherwise have been outside the grasp of federal courts. In 
essence, it allows the federal government to “reach in” to Indian Country 
and exercise power over a person who is outside of the jurisdiction of 
United States.78 The MCA does the same with Indians. “Indian,” in this 
case, does not make sense in any other terms than those of a political 
identification. The MCA’s grant of jurisdiction is not over a select race; it is 
over lands and people controlled by a different sovereign power: the tribe. 
The GCA and MCA were not necessary passed because of a lack of federal 
jurisdiction over people of a certain ancestry per se. Rather, because Indian 
Country is under the jurisdiction of quasi-sovereign nations, the power to 
prosecute criminals is inherent to those nations and recognized under 
federal law.79 “Outside of Indian country, the Indian is the same as 
everyone else in the eyes of the law.”80  
It is clear that the notion of who is Indian, is, as the Supreme Court has 
said, an identity vis-à-vis a relationship with the federal government: a 
question of to whom one is most directly answerable, the tribal government 
or the United States government.81 In reference to legislation which pertains 
directly to Indians, the Court has said that statutory references to Indians 
are not as “a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-
sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the 
[federal government] in a unique fashion.”82 
  
                                                                                                                 
 78. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (citing Fisher v. District Court, 
424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976)) (“[W]e reject the argument that denying (the Indian plaintiffs) 
access to the Montana courts constitutes impermissible racial discrimination. The exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from 
the quasi-sovereign status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law.”).  
 79. Id.  
 80. William C. Canby, Jr., Tribal Court, Federal Court, State Court: A Jurisdictional 
Primer, ARIZ. ATT’Y, July 1993, at 24, 25. 
 81. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974). 
 82. Id. 
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VI. Native Or Judge: Who Should Have the Power to Say Who Is an 
Indian? 
At the onset of this note, mentioned briefly was the fact that tribes have 
the power to determine their own membership.83 While this has been 
reaffirmed time and again by various federal courts, it exists more as a legal 
optimism than anything else. How can a tribe be said to create its own 
membership requirements when any number of federal entities still engage 
in a determination of who is an Indian beyond asking the question of 
whether or not they are enrolled in a federally recognized tribe? The answer 
seems to be that the inquiring entities are attempting to determine whether 
or not an individual claiming to be or not to be an Indian has the requisite 
relationship with the federal government. “The definition of ‘Indian’ is the 
measure of eligibility that the government uses for benefits and preferences 
provided to Indians under a variety of federal programs.”84 With few 
exceptions, membership in a federally recognized tribe is a necessary 
precursor to being an Indian for the purposes of any federal statute.85 The 
Ninth Circuit, in Zepeda, recognized that the best source of identifying 
“federally acknowledged Indian tribes whose members or affiliates satisfy 
the threshold criminal jurisdiction inquiry” is the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ 
list of federally recognized tribes published to the Federal Register (BIA 
list).86 After acknowledging that there is a list created and updated regularly 
by the federal government, which contains the names of every Indian 
community in the nation with the requisite relationship with the federal 
government necessary for federal criminal prosecution, how is it that there 
is some additional factor that the courts consider when determining whether 
or not federal jurisdiction exists under the GCA and MCA?  
Because each tribe on the BIA list is, as a matter of fact, federally 
recognized, it logically follows that enrolled members of those tribes are 
federally recognized as Indians. Moreover, there is a safeguard in place 
such that not just any group of people can get together and call themselves 
an Indian tribe: any tribe that now seeks federal recognition must petition 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).  
 84. Brownell, supra note 44, at 276. 
 85. Id. at 282 (pointing out only two acts, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 
1976 and the Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 which do not specifically require membership in a 
federally recognized tribe). 
 86. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 211 (2013) (citing Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 
186, 215 (1962)). 
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the BIA.87 This process can sometimes take years, and not all tribes that 
petition are accepted.88 It seems logical to assume then that if Indian tribes 
are allowed to set their own membership requirements, and are also 
required to petition the federal government for recognition, then at the point 
that they become recognized, the federal government has in fact approved 
of their membership requirements. The Bruce Test’s requirement that the 
government must prove a defendant’s blood lineage to a federally 
recognized tribe overrides the tribe’s ability to determine its membership 
and infringes upon tribal sovereignty. It is the equivalent of denying 
someone status as a federally recognized Indian when the tribe and federal 
government (outside of the judiciary) have already conferred that status on 
them. Continuing to use the Bruce Test takes away a tribe’s sovereign 
power to determine its own members in those instances like Zepeda, where 
the court holds that enrollment in a federally recognized tribe is not enough 
to prove that someone is an Indian.  
Additionally, the Bruce Test, by including a strictly racial component, 
fails to produce accurate parameters for gauging whether someone is 
“Indian” for the purposes of the GCA and MCA. The Supreme Court, as 
discussed supra, has premised the legitimacy of statutory delineations 
between Indians and non-Indians, at least in recent history, on the idea that 
such distinctions are political and not racial.89 However, the use of blood 
quantum to determine who meets the standard, on its face, is wholly racial. 
It shocks the conscience that federal courts continue the masquerade that 
“Indian” is something other than a racial distinction when in its application 
and history, especially pertaining to the GCA and MCA, it is strikingly 
clear that whether someone is “Indian” is a racial determination. 
Furthermore, for some tribes and legislators, the trend in recent years has 
been to move away from blood quantum requirements.90 It is disturbing that 
the one area of law where race is still a major factor is in the criminal arena. 
Using the Bruce Test yields untenable and biased results that run 
contrary to legislative purposes. Assuming that Antelope is an accurate 
rendering of Federal Indian Law, what results from applying the Bruce Test 
is inconsistent. The thrust of whether someone is an Indian is not based on 
whether a great grandmother was an Indian. Instead, if that person partakes 
in a relationship with a tribe to the extent they answer to another sovereign 
                                                                                                                 
 87. 25 C.F.R. § 83.3 (2014); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Politics, History, and 
Semantics: The Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes, 82 N.D. L. REV. 487, 489–90 (2006). 
 88. Fletcher, supra note 87, at 491. 
 89. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1977). 
 90. Brownell, supra note 44, at 281–82. 
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power beyond the federal government.91 The latter question is not one of 
blood, but of self-identification. There are people born with blood derived 
from federally recognized tribes that do not claim to be Indian and do not 
have the requisite relationship with the federal government to be classified 
as an Indian (in relation to the second prong of the Bruce Test). The 
opposite is also true, especially in light of the fact that some federally 
recognized tribes do not require a blood quantum.92 There is a very real 
possibility that members of federally recognized tribes who fully meet the 
requisite relationship with the federal government from a political 
standpoint would fall outside of the scope of federal jurisdiction solely 
because they cannot make a showing of blood quantum in a manner that 
suits the Ninth Circuit.  
This is essentially what happened in Zepeda. The court reasoned that 
because “Tohono O’odham Nation of Arizona” and not “Tohono O’odham” 
appeared in the federal register as a recognized tribe, that Zepeda could not 
be proven to have lineage to a federally recognized tribe.93 The court never 
mentioned the fact that the Gila River Indian Community, the name that 
appears on the federal register, is not even the name of an Indian tribe! The 
Gila River Indian Community is a tribal reservation composed of two 
separate tribes: the Akimel O’odham (Pima) and the Maricopa (Pee Posh).94 
This relationship is similar to a more famous (albeit inverse) example - the 
Iroquois Nation. The Iroquois is not a tribe of Indians, but rather is a 
confederacy of separate tribal nations, and the name “Iroquois” is not listed 
on the BIA list.95 Although both the Maricopa and Akimel O’odham have 
been federally recognized tribes for over 100 years, neither of their names 
appear as such on the BIA list.  
Not only is the test that the Ninth Circuit used wholly inadequate to 
serve the purpose for which it is used, but the Ninth Circuit failed to apply 
it correctly. In the context of Zepeda, the name “Tohono O’odham” was 
little more than a red herring. It was Zepeda’s Pima blood rather than his 
Tohono O’odham blood that the court should have traced. Whether or not 
the Ninth Circuit recognized that Pima was an alternate name for the 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646. 
 92. Thomas R. Myers & Jonathan J. Siebers, The Indian Child Welfare Act, MICH. B.J., 
July 2004, at 19, 21 (discussing blood quantum requirements under the Indian Child Welfare 
Act). 
 93. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 212 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 94. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 452. 
 95. Mary Druke Becker, “We Are an Independent Nation:” A History of Iroquois 
Sovereignty, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 981, 983 (1998). 
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Akimel O’odham is unclear. What is clear is that the court engaged in a 
narrow and wholly illegitimate interpretation of federal law by merely 
scanning a list of tribal names without considering the fact that the Indian 
community, whose document it rendered insufficient to serve as proof of a 
bloodline from a federally recognized tribe, bore the name of neither of the 
tribes comprising it.  
Additional scrutiny as to a person’s Indian status makes sense in areas 
outside of criminal jurisdiction because of the massive amount of federal 
funds appropriated based on census findings.96 But how is it that the courts 
ever decided that an inquiry beyond “Is this person a member of a federally 
recognized tribe?” was necessary to determine whether someone is an 
Indian under the MCA and GCA? The answer again seems to be found in 
Rogers. By making “Indian” a racial distinction, the court in Rogers sought 
to prevent “white men of every description” from “at pleasure settl[ing] 
among [Indians], and, by procuring an adoption by one of these tribes, 
throw[ing] off all responsibility to the laws of the United States.”97 Rogers 
came before the MCA at a time when federal courts still lacked jurisdiction 
over Indians in Indian Country. The irony of this history in the context of 
Zepeda is that the same rule created by the courts to protect from people 
evading federal jurisdiction is now being used to do precisely that, and at 
great cost to the tribes. 
VII. Dodging Race: How Could the Ninth Circuit Decided Zepeda 
Differently? 
Was the holding in Zepeda an inevitable result? There are three clear 
ways in which the court could have avoided such a devastating holding. 
First, the primary object of this note, is to denounce the Bruce Test. By 
limiting the inquiry into the defendant’s Indian status to whether or not he 
was an enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe, the court would 
never need to decide this issue of blood. Second, the court could have 
followed the dissent, which “disagree[d] with the majority’s ultimate 
determination that the government failed to present sufficient evidence 
from which a rational jury could infer that Zepeda has a blood connection 
to a federally recognized tribe.”98 Third, and perhaps better still, the court 
could have followed the Eighth Circuit’s precedent. 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Brownell, supra note 44, at 276. 
 97. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846). 
 98. Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 214 (Watford, J., dissenting). 
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The Eighth Circuit case, United States v. White Horse,99 provides a clear 
alternative to the Bruce Test, which is particularly applicable to Zepeda. In 
White Horse, the defendant, Guy White Horse, was charged with sexual 
molestation of his six-year-old son under the GCA.100 He appealed his 
conviction, arguing that he was in fact an Indian, and the government had 
failed to meet their evidential burden of proving that he was not.101 The 
court held there was no plain error:  
[B]ecause of the complementary nature of § 1152 and § 1153. 
There is no contention that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that Mr. White Horse committed the physical acts 
charged in the indictment, and regardless of which statute 
applied (one of them certainly did) Mr. White Horse was guilty 
of a federal crime because he, like everyone else, is either an 
Indian or he is not . . . . [W]e believe that the situation here is the 
same as it would be if we were dealing not with two statutes but 
with a single one that provided that it applied whether or not the 
defendant was an Indian.102 
Mr. White Horse, just like Zepeda, committed a crime that falls within 
both statutes.103 Had the Ninth Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit’s 
reasoning, there would have been no need to delve into the sufficiency of 
the evidence of Zepeda’s Indian status since the court still had jurisdiction 
under the GCA. Essentially, specific to the facts of Zepeda, his status as 
Indian should not have been dispositive as to whether the court had 
jurisdiction. 
It is hard to grasp exactly why the Ninth Circuit chose the route it took. It 
seems wildly unnecessary to engage in the discussion which is, at times, 
inconsistent with the court’s own precedent. For instance, the court 
discussed at length the decision in United States v. Maggi to support the 
proposition that a bloodline traceable to a federally recognized tribe was an 
essential part of the first prong of the Bruce Test.104 Maggi dealt with two 
                                                                                                                 
 99. 316 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 100. Id. at 771. 
 101. Id. at 772. 
 102. Id. at 772–73. 
 103. United States v. Dodge, 538 F.2d 770, 775 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that assault fell 
within the jurisdictional reach of the General Crimes Act). 
 104. United States v. Zepeda, 738 F.3d 201, 210 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. 
Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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defendants, Gordon Mann and Shane Maggi.105 Mann claimed to be a 
member of the Little Shell Tribe of the Chippewa Cree, a tribe that is not 
federally recognized,106 unlike Zepeda, where the reference to Tohono 
O’odham may or may not have been to a federally recognized tribe. More, 
the court found that the “Blackfeet” blood of Maggi was sufficiently 
traceable to a federally recognized tribe even though the name on the BIA 
list is the “Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation of 
Montana.”107 The court stretches its precedent so far that it becomes hardly 
recognizable. The errors in the opinion, such as the mistaken reference to 
“Tiho” instead of “T.O.” or “Ak-Chin Indian Reservation” rather than the 
“Maricopa (Ak-Chin) Indian Reservation,” would be forgivable in many 
contexts. However, in an opinion where the harbinger of the court’s 
argument is that the defendant’s blood certificate said “Tohono O’odham” 
instead of “Tohono O’odham Nation of Arizona,” such mistakes are 
unacceptable. 
VIII. Conclusion 
Damien Zepeda was an enrolled member of the Gila River Indian 
Community.108 This community of federally recognized Indians, enjoying 
that status since at least 1934,109 conferred on him the status of a federally 
recognized Indian by way of an official document - his “Tribal Enrollment 
Certificate.”110 The Ninth Circuit applied a test, which makes federal 
jurisdiction under the MCA exclusively applicable to people of a certain 
race.111 Although evidence was presented that (1) Damien Zepeda was an 
enrolled member of a federally recognized Indian community, and (2) that 
his blood was “1/4 Pima” and “1/4 Tohono O’odham,” the court overturned 
his conviction based on the idea that no juror could have found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that his bloodline was derived from a federally recognized 
tribe.112 Neither the official documents presented, the testimony of tribal 
officials, nor even the testimony of Zepeda's brother as to his lineage was 
sufficient evidence. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit established precedent 
supporting the argument that an official document from a federally 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Maggi, 598 F.3d at 1076. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 1082. 
 108. Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 204. 
 109. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 440. 
 110. Zepeda, 738 F.3d at 204. 
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recognized tribe, which contains a certificate specifying the degree of 
Indian blood of the enrolled member, is insufficient to prove that a person 
has a necessary degree of blood from a federally recognized tribe.113  
The Zepeda court shows, in striking fashion, why courts should not be 
deciding who is or is not an Indian. The lack of uniformity of a definition of 
“Indian” in federal legislation - there are, in fact, over thirty-three different 
definitions under federal law114 - is evidence of the inability of Indians to fit 
neatly into a box of western ideology. Though the Supreme Court has 
recognized the unconstitutionality of premising Indian status on race, the 
application of the law, particularly in criminal jurisdiction, continues to 
focus on race.115 Whether or not individual tribes continue to use blood 
quantum as part of their enrollment requirements is, as a matter of law, their 
sovereign power.116 As a matter of science, however, strict adherence to 
blood quantum requirements will eventually lead to the “extinction” of 
Indian tribes.117 But in any case, blood quantum as a concept is a distinctly 
non-Indian idea that has more or less been forced on the tribes by federal 
regulation.118 If the tribes choose to require blood quantum, so be it, but it is 
a choice that the tribes, not the courts, can make. For federal criminal 
jurisdiction, the test as to whether someone is an Indian should end after a 
determination of whether or not they are enrolled members of a federally 
recognized tribe. 
Damien Zepeda is an Indian. He is not an Indian just because he has 
Pima blood in his veins. His Tohono O’odham blood does not make him an 
Indian either. The Gila River Indian Community, in its sovereign power, a 
power inherent to it and recognized by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the 
federal government at large, recognizes Damien Zepeda as an Indian. For 
the purposes of federal Indian law, that makes him an Indian, and it is 
emphatically not the province of the federal courts to say otherwise. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. at 213. 
 114. Brownell, supra note 44, at 278. 
 115. See generally United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 
 116. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981); Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978). 
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